The first article I chose is “The 1956 Suez Crisis,” and it can be found at
http://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472108670-06.pdf.
(Two cautions:
-- The article is 30 pages long.
-- I did not know until I opened the document that it was password-protected; the only option I had was to read it. I wanted to know why. I found out that it is a chapter from the book,
Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy, written by Rose McDermott, and published in 1998 by the University of Michigan Press.)
The article can be connected to three Social Studies topics: geography; politics; and history. Geographically, the Suez Canal and its surrounding environments are places, which have different meanings to different people. They are in Egypt. Depending on this meaning, some people are willing to do whatever is necessary to take something away from the current owner. Some of these politically-motivated actions carry a greater level of risk. Once the person or group has taken possession of the object of their desire, they have to keep it. Nothing lasts forever. Eventually, someone else will come along and become the new owner. This continuous cycle of events is added to the historical record. The idea of a shipping channel in the eastern Mediterranean area is hundreds (if not thousands) of years old. In modern times, construction began in 1859. The Suez Canal opened in 1869, the same year the east and west coasts of the United States were connected by the Central Pacific and Union Pacific Railroads.
By 1950, Egypt was approaching the limit of its tolerance of British occupation and control. Gamal Abdel Nasser became the country's President in 1952, shortly after the British were evicted. This did not resolve the disagreements that still existed between Egypt, France, and Britain. These two countries still felt that they should have a say in matters related to this international waterway. The role of the United States was still minimal. Harry Truman was President, and he was **not** willing to get involved in the affairs of countries along the Mediterranean Sea. This would change in January 1953, with the inauguration of Dwight Eisenhower. He and his advisors, particularly new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, **were** interested in becoming meddlers. Nasser was not happy with this development. He did not want to be told how he should conduct Egypt's affairs.
As noted in The Lemon Tree, "Nasser's emergence would rattle officials from Washington to London to Paris to Tel Aviv [and] tensions between Egypt and Israel would increase in the coming years" (Tolan, 102). Nasser took his risk in July 1956. He closed the Suez Canal. His action was not popular with either Britain, France, or the United States. One of his objectives was to raise the fees paid by the Canal's users and use the money to help fund the construction of the Aswan Dam. The United States
did eventually get involved by providing financial support to for the Aswan project, in exchange for the option of increasing military presence in the Middle East. Eisenhower knew that his decision had a potentially serious risk. This was during the early days of the Cold War. Any increase of military strength in this area by the United States would be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a threat to its national security.
(As important as the Canal was to the region, author Tolan only makes a few refernces to it in the main portion of the book. He devotes at least as much coverage in the Notes section.)
The Suez crisis lasted approximately four months. In early November, a truce was announced by the United Nations. One of the conditions of the truce was that the British would withdraw their remaining troops by the end of 1956. The other condition, that Israel withdraw
its troops from the Gaza Strip, was not completed until the spring of 1957. We know this would not be a long-term arrangement.
John
